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TheComponents of
Bank Credit
The statistical analysis of the preceding chapter may underestimate the
credit effect by not distinguishing between bank loans and investments,
since they could influence particular interest rates differently. Bank
loans, for example, should have the greatest impact on commercial
paper and bank loan rates; and bank investments, on security yields.
We can examine such differential effects by dividing the total earning
assets of the banking system into loans to customers and purchases of
securities on the open market. The latter consist of Federal Reserve
credit outstanding exclusive of loans to member banks (item 2 in Table
4-1) plus investments of commercial banks (item 15). Mortgages are
classified as loans in banking data, and only the annual data provide
sufficient detail to treat them as investments, a more appropriate
classification here because mortgage interest rates behave similarly to
long-term rates.
Table 5-1 repeats the previous regressions, with the credit variable
subdivided into loans, L, and investments, I (Treasury debt operations
omitted). The regressions are in the form:
iLdL+$JdI+/L(dMdLdJ) (1)
where the third term on the right is the residual source of monetary
growth excluding the contribution of bank credit. As before, the re-
gressions were run as first differences, and in all of them the cyclical
movement was held constant by dummy variables in order to remove
the cyclical response of loans to credit demand. (Also, the figures in82 The Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest Rates
TABLE 5-1
Relation Between Interest Rates and Two Components of Bank Credit,






and Period (f3,) f3L —
Changes Between Reference Cycle Stages
19 19—61
Commercial paper —3.1(3.2)—3.1(3.8) —0.1(0.0) —2.6(3.4)
Bank loans —2.2(3.9) —1.1(2.2) —1.1(1.9)—1.1(2.4)
Treasury bills —2.9(2.9)—4.0(4.9)+1.0(0.9) —3.3(4.1)
U.S. bonds —1.4(2.9)—1.5(3.7)+0.1(0.2)—1.1(2.9)
Corp. and municipal
bonds —1.4(3.0) —0.9(2.2)—0.5(1.1) —1.1(2.8)
1948—6 1
Commercial paper —7.7(2.1) —6.1(3.0) —1.7(0.5) —4.5(2.1)
Bank loans —2.4(1.5) —1.4(1.6) —1.0(0.8) —1.1(1.2)






1896—1963 —9.5(6.4) —6.5(4.9) —3.0(1.7) —7.5(3.6)
Treasury bills,
1920—63 —5.5(1.8)—4.4(2.6) —1.1(0.4) —5.4(2.1)
U.S. bonds, 1919—62 —2.8(3.1) —1.3(1.9) —1.5(1.7) —1.2(1.0)
Corp. and municipal
bonds, 1900—63 —2.4(3.9)—1.1(2.2)—1.3(1.8) —1.5(1.8)
Note: Figures in parentheses are tvalueswith signs omitted. These regressions are
based on equation Iin the text.
Changes between reference stage averages:
=j3,4[dL/(L+I)] -1- 134[dII(L+ 1)] + + 1)]
—[d(L+ I)/(L + I)J} + + constant.
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Notes to Table 5-i(concluded)
Changesbetween annual rates of change:
= M) + + (dM/M) —[d(L+ 1)/M)} + 6D + constant
where i is the interest rate; M,totalmoney stock; L loans of commercial banks; and I
Federal Reserve credit outstanding exclusive of loans to banks plus investments of
commercial banks. The D's are dummy variables, as explained in the appendix to
Chapter 3. /3k,andare regression coefficients. The operatordenotes first dif-
ferences in reference stage averages or in annual data. For 1919—61, L and I pertain to
weekly reporting member banks; for 1948—61, to all commercial banks. For reference
stage averages based on monthly data, mortgages are classified in the original data as
loans, but for annual changes as investments (correctly for present purposes).
Unlike the regressions in the previous chapter, the independent variables for reference
stages here were divided by earning assets rather than the money stock. In the reference
stage equations, dL/d(L + I), dI/d(L -1- 1), and dM/d(L + 1) are reference stage averages
of monthly percentage changes, converted to annual rates. However, dM/d(L +1) was
approximated by (dM/M) [M/(L + I)], in which reference stage averages were com-
puted before taking the product, because stage averages of dM/M were already avail-
able.
Source: See the data appendix.
Table 5-1 were computed at an earlier time than those in the fore-
going tables. As explained in the note to Table 5-1, these regressions
were run with slightly different versions of some of the variables and
have earlier terminal dates; two of the annual regressions have an
earlier starting date. But these differences are minor.)
The credit theory implies that the loan coefficient should be larger in
absolute value than the investment coefficient for commercial paper
and bank loan rates, and smaller for security yields. The results only
faintly support that implication. For commercial paper and bank loan
rates, the absolute value of the regression coefficient for loans is indeed
slightly larger than that for investments, and vice versa for Treasury
bill and U.S. bond yields, except in the annual regressions. For the
other bond series and the annual regressions, however, the coefficients
are not uniformly consistent with the credit theory. In particular, the
effect of investments is not generally greater on security yields than
the effect of loans. Moreover, no pair of loan and investment coeffi-
cients differs significantly at the .05level,though that for bank loans
1919—61 almost does.
Furthermore, if we compare the two credit effects with that of resid-
ual monetary growth, the former are not relatively larger (in absolute_ -
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value) here than they were in Chapter 4, where loans and investments
were not separated. Failure to make the separation, therefore, does not
produce an underestimate of the credit effect.
If there were little or no arbitrage among financial markets, credit
expansion in particular markets would affect local interest rates. The
results suggest some initial effect, but it is slight and apparently short-
lived, even for the markets for which bank credit supposedly plays a
dominant role —commercialpaper and bank loans.
The cornerstone of the credit theory is the alleged independence of
financial markets. Special circumstances may produce partial inde-
pendence, as in the mortgage market. But, in general, studies which
have looked for individual supply effects in particular financial markets
have found the effects to be weak or nonexistent. Alternative oppor-
tunities for demanders and access by alternative suppliers appear to
keep these subsectors in line with the financial market as a whole. The
present results confirm this conclusion.